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Summary
•	 Medicines and allied products, including vaccines and diagnostics, will cost the English NHS 
£16 billion this year (2016 gross figure, NHS discounts not deducted). They account for up to 13 per 
cent of total health service spending, or about 1 per cent of GDP. Expenditures on this scale require 
careful control. However, overall medicines outlays are as a percentage of national income below the 
OECD average. NHS prices are for many treatments lower than those accepted in countries such as 
France and Germany.
•	 Pharmaceutical advances, including improved use of existing products as well as new treatments, 
are estimated to have been responsible for around half of the 15 year gain in life expectancy at birth 
seen UK wide since the creation of the NHS in 1948. They will in future generate further gains in 
areas such as oncology and neurology and the treatment of rare diseases. The British public has 
important interests in both assuring the affordability of pharmaceutical products and encouraging 
further industrial investment in pharmaceutical research, development, production and supply.
•	 The Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme (PPRS) and NICE play important roles in limiting both 
the prices paid for individual medicines and the overall costs of pharmaceuticals in England. Since 
the 1950s the NHS has also built up world-class expertise in the purchasing of both generic and 
branded medicines for hospital use through tendering based processes. Such procurement skills are 
important in supporting specialised care provision as well as day-to-day care. In the case of branded 
products Multi-provider Framework Agreements can when working well allow local clinicians and 
patients to choose treatments appropriate for their needs while containing nationwide costs.
•	 UK law relating to the public procurement of items such as medicines is based on a relatively new 
(2014) EU Directive. It is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. Since public spending on 
purchasing goods and services from private suppliers accounts for about 15 per cent of all economic 
activity in countries like the UK it is vital to obtain optimum value for money while stimulating ongoing 
innovation. Both the European Commission and HM Treasury emphasise that simply minimising 
purchase prices does not guarantee best value.
•	 Identifying the ‘Most Economically Advantageous Tenders’ (MEATs) on offer involves assessing the 
‘whole life’ value of competing bids, and exploring all aspects of the value that can be generated by 
constructive partnerships between producers like research based pharmaceutical companies and 
the users of their products. People with unmet therapeutic needs can gain both from fundamental 
scientific progress and from developments in the ways that established treatments are used to 
optimise individual health outcomes.
•	 During tendering processes weightings can be applied to each quality crierion to identify ‘best buys’. 
However, this can in practice be difficult to achieve in a manner acceptable to all the stakeholders 
involved. Significant legal constraints may also apply. Consequently, the forces favouring ‘lowest 
price’ as against ‘optimum value’ purchasing are often hard to overcome. Achieving due sensitivity 
to both personal needs and wider community interests demands a robust balance between serving 
patient and public interest focused professional concerns on the one hand and the pursuit of financial 
savings on the other.
Tender Loving Care?
Purchasing medicines for continuing therapeutic 
improvement and better health outcomes
This report was commissioned and funded by Shire plc.  Full editorial control rested with the LSE authors.
Embargo	–	not	for	publication	before	00.01	hours	Thursday	10	november	2016.
2 Tender Loving Care?
•	 The bleeding disorders known as haemophilia are today treated with replacement blood Factors 
produced by recombinant bio-engineering technologies. This field offers an example of one in which 
the use of tendering systems to purchase medicines is estimated to have cut costs by around a 
third in about 10 years without undermining access to medicines. However, the contributions of 
pharmaceutical companies to improving outcomes through initiatives such as funding outcome 
data bases and specialist nurses should be recognised in contracting processes. There is evidence 
that outcomes for people living with haemophilia could be further improved by more personalised 
care.
•	 Despite controversies regarding the provision of ‘cutting edge’ cancer treatments to NHS patients 
and the UK’s historically poor record in overall research funding compared with nations like South 
Korea, the US, Germany and France, this country’s performance with regard to pharmaceutical 
research and care has to date been relatively good. However, future failures to achieve well balanced 
medicine procurement and linked commissioning and care strategies could undermine partnerships 
between pharmaceutical companies and NHS organisations like specialist care centres. This might 
impede health service improvements and harm the economy.
•	 In the period leading up to Britain’s withdrawal from the European Union the health service may, along 
with other public services, have to face new pressures associated with reduced national earnings 
and falling tax receipts. There is a danger that this will cause NHS hospital/specialised medicines 
procurement, which since the troubled NHS reforms has become more directly influenced by NHS 
England, to be focused on cutting immediate costs rather than seeking maximum patient and 
community benefits. At worst, this could alienate NHS users and clinicians, whose cooperation is vital 
for allowing Multi-supplier Framework Agreements for obtaining branded medicines to function well.
•	 Inadequate procurement approaches might also threaten the sustainable supply of some medicines 
and further undermine the UK science base. Some commentators fear that the latter is already at 
risk of being damaged by the medium to long term consequences of ‘Brexit’.
Recommendations
•	 Policy makers in England and the other UK countries should seek to ensure that the strategic 
thinking underlying the MEAT approach outlined in the revised 2014 European (Public) Procurement 
Directive is made central to the tendering methods and decision making employed in the NHS. 
Otherwise the system that will evolve could, contrary to the underlying aims of NICE and the UK 
Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme, come to focus exclusively on minimising the purchase 
prices of treatments at the expense of quality and ongoing product and service innovation.
•	 Explicit mechanisms should be in place to preserve a good balance between promoting medicines 
affordability and incentivising innovation. One step towards this could involve creating a system for 
research based pharmaceutical companies to have their performance as ‘NHS Innovation Partners’ 
evaluated and recognised by an independent body. Once awarded, such rankings could – with 
other relevant variables – be used to help weight MEAT procurement decisions in order to prevent 
them being ‘swamped’ by price minimisation pressures.
•	 Without appropriate safeguards to limit the counter-productive use of monopsony (single purchaser) 
powers it may become increasingly difficult to deliver the twin goals of preserving a high quality 
health care system and ensuring that this country provides an attractive setting for researching, 
developing and providing better pharmaceutical treatments. In the final analysis the health service 
must keep within its allocated budget. But the ultimate purpose of the NHS is to help make sure 
that Britain enjoys an equitable and prosperous society, and that that individuals affected by illness 
receive the best care that it is possible for the community to offer to citizens who are disadvantaged 
by potentially disabling and life threatening diseases.
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Introduction
April 17th 2016 was World Haemophilia Day. It was also 
the day that it became mandatory for European Union 
Member States to adopt the provisions of a new Directive 
on Procurement (2014/24/EU) by public bodies into their 
national legal frameworks. Its terms and requirements 
replaced those set out in an earlier 2004 Directive. They 
seek to remove unnecessary bureaucracy and improve 
the efficiency and effectiveness of the purchasing of 
goods and services undertaken by publicly funded 
bodies, while also curbing tendencies to undermine 
community-wide interests by minimising the prices of 
items at the expense of quality and ongoing innovation.
At first sight European public sector procurement policy 
might not seem like a topic that should be of any great 
interest to doctors, political leaders or the members of 
other groups whose main concerns centre on protecting 
patient and public health in the UK, especially now that 
the country has voted to leave the EU. Yet in reality it has 
important implications for the future of not only Europe’s 
economy but also that of Britain in an era of increasing 
challenge, both social and financial. More narrowly, 
procurement policies have potentially important impacts 
on the development and appropriate supply of not only 
established ‘generic’ (off-patent, unbranded) medicines 
but also newer treatments that can prevent, alleviate 
or cure non-communicable ‘genetic’ conditions like 
cancers or rarer disorders such as haemophilia, or those 
transmissible infections that still threaten humanity. 
Examples of the latter include AIDS and Hepatitis C.
The Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme (PPRS) 
has for decades played an important part in limiting the 
overall costs of NHS medicines and allied pharmaceutical 
products. Since the end of the 1990s the National 
Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) has – in 
England and Wales – also been very visibly involved in 
judging the extent to which selected new treatments are 
sufficiently cost effective for NHS use. It currently has 
a pivotal role in defining the therapeutic entitlements of 
NHS users seeking care that meets their needs.
However, over and above the work of the PPRS 
and NICE and its Scottish counterpart, The Scottish 
Medicines Consortium (SMC), procuring both generic 
and branded medicines demands direct purchasing 
skills. This is particularly so in hospital and other specialist 
care contexts, including those in which the volume of 
pharmaceuticals used is comparatively small but the unit 
costs of alternative products tend to be high. In such 
instances pharmaceutical procurement is likely to involve 
tendering processes and the issuing of contracts for the 
supply of treatments that meet individual needs in a way 
that is affordable for the NHS as a whole, given the finite 
resources available.
Identifying what are genuinely the best value (or in the 
language of the 2014 Procurement Directive, the ‘Most 
Economically Advantageous Tender’ – MEAT) offers 
from companies that not only manufacture sophisticated 
products such as ‘biological’ medicines to a high 
standard but in addition seek to provide them in ways 
that help improve health outcomes, can be a difficult task. 
High quality medicines procurement goes beyond simply 
seeking to minimise the unit prices paid. In the health 
arena successful strategies should also aim to ensure 
that adequate production capacity is maintained in the 
medium to long term and that financial savings are not 
obtained at the cost of undermining appropriate forms 
of clinical freedom and patient choice. Avoiding needless 
costs is obviously important. Yet unduly low prices tend 
to drive out competition and create shortages.
Constructive co-operation between producers and 
the users of goods like pharmaceuticals is also to be 
encouraged. This requires purchasers to be sensible 
of the commercial realities affecting organisations 
such as privately (and publicly) owned companies. 
No independent firm can over sustained periods 
produce good quality items and invest in research and 
development without making profits sufficient to attract 
ongoing capital investment. Yet at the same time all 
successful health sector enterprises need to make the 
promotion of patient and wider community wellbeing 
their central goal. This means that companies selling 
to the NHS need to act with insight and restraint when 
health care providers are facing rising demands but 
stable or falling funding.
Against this background, the objective of this brief 
report is to provide an overview of the changing system 
for purchasing NHS medicines and allied products in 
England, and the parts to be played in obtaining good 
value for money by not only health professionals such 
as pharmacists and doctors but experts in procurement 
working as positively as possible with partners in industry 
and patient organisations. It explores why price alone is 
often only a partial guide to value. Relevant concerns 
range from variations in the pharmaceutical and/or 
pharmacological properties of alternative treatments and 
the benefits they offer individuals through to the extent 
to which competing companies invest in clinical care 
improvement and patient support programmes.
Balancing price and value
The analysis offered starts with a brief overview of 
the strategic drivers of procurement policy and the 
systems in place for purchasing hospital medicines, 
including specialist treatments, and limiting their costs 
in England. It then considers a range of examples taken 
from key therapeutic areas like haemophilia care and 
cancer service provision. The former is an important 
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example because of the volumes of relatively expensive 
replacement blood Factors needed by comparatively 
small numbers of patients to protect them against 
disabling and on occasions potentially fatal bleeds, 
and the fact that there are continuing opportunities to 
improve outcomes. Finally, a number of ways in which 
NHS medicines procurement practices – which are 
already amongst the most advanced in the world – might 
be further improved are discussed, and reform options 
considered.
The UK’s future relationship with the EU is presently 
uncertain. The June 2016 referendum decision to leave 
the Union might eventually lead to questions about issues 
such the viability of University biomedical research in this 
country and the continuing capacity of the NHS to offer 
comprehensive taxation funded health care. But what is 
more certain at the moment is that the need to contain 
spending in order to withstand what could prove to be 
escalating pressures on NHS and wider public finances 
should as far as possible be met in ways that encourage 
innovation. Efforts to contain costs should be consistent 
with preserving the standing of countries like England 
and Scotland as good places in which to invest and go 
on improving medicinal and other products and services.
Two other introductory points deserve emphasis. The 
first relates to the fact that in all advanced economies 
public purchasing is accounting for a growing share 
of total economic activity. In Europe as a whole it now 
represents in the order of 16 per cent of the Union’s GDP 
(European Commission, 2014), or about €2.3 trillion per 
annum1. The equivalent figure for the UK is in excess 
of £230 billion – Cabinet Office, 2015. Expenditure 
at this scale has the potential, if not undertaken in an 
appropriately directed manner, to seriously distort future 
patterns of economic and social development.
Compared with the overall value of public procurement 
the total amount spent on medicines and associated 
items such as vaccines is modest, although still significant 
in absolute terms. EU wide it stands at about €200 billion 
annually, or around 1.5 per cent of the European Union 
GDP (OECD, 2015). The proportion of Britain’s national 
income spent on NHS medicines and allied goods is 
approaching 1 per cent. Of the overall amount spent 
on pharmaceutical products in this country under a 
half involves purchasing via direct NHS tendering. This 
is because the great majority of community supplied 
medicines are bought by local pharmacies from national 
wholesalers, or on occasions directly from manufacturers 
or other intermediate sources.
The impacts of tendering for medicines used in centrally 
funded specialist care can be especially influential, in 
as much as the State (or its agent) is in effect acting 
as the sole purchaser of key treatments used within 
1 Based on the World Bank estimate that the EU’s GDP stood at 
just over US $ 16 trillion in 2015
its borders. In areas such as rare disease care robust 
working partnerships between medicine manufacturers 
and clinicians, supported by ‘expert patients’ and their 
representatives, can be particularly valuable2.
As compared to high technology goods like, say, 
computers, jet engines and other complex engineering 
products, medicines are normally composed of 
just a few key substances and can from a technical 
standpoint be easy for expert manufacturers to copy, 
even though this is less true of some biologically based 
treatments than it is for those with small molecule ‘active 
pharmaceutical ingredients’ (APIs). Such observations 
underline the fact that a high proportion of the value of 
innovative medicines lies in the ‘know-how’ associated 
with their clinical development and optimal therapeutic 
use. It is also worth noting that the modern therapeutic 
armamentarium now involves many thousands of 
medicinal drugs and allied products. Those purchased 
in low volumes and low controlled prices are likely to be 
particularly difficult for commercial suppliers to provide 
on a sustainable basis without periods of unavailability.
The shift towards more personalised 
treatment
The second set of factors worth highlighting relates 
to the changing nature of the pharmaceutical market. 
As the focus of scientific innovation becomes more 
concentrated on developing targeted, often large 
biological molecule based, treatments for relatively small 
user groups, so the proportion of patients being cared for 
via hospital based or other specialist centres is tending to 
rise. With this shift from primary care it appears inevitable 
that over time there will be a corresponding increase in 
the proportion of NHS medicines procured via tendering 
as opposed to methods such as ‘spot purchasing’ by 
independent contractors.
People whose jobs centre on limiting costs and keeping 
within defined budgets must be highly sensitive to 
product prices and volume usages. Especially in periods 
of austerity, pharmaceutical spending is in political 
and public debate terms highly visible. Yet even today 
it accounts for little more than a tenth of overall health 
service costs in net terms. This proportion has remained 
(mainly because when their intellectual property rights 
expire the prices of medicines and allied goods normally 
fall towards commodity levels) at around this level for 
about half a century – see Figure 1.
2 When only one branded medicine supplied by a single producer 
is available for treating a condition tendering based procurement 
– which demands competition – is not a viable option. In some 
circumstance NICE is de facto responsible for defining prices in 
England and Wales via the negotiation of Patient Access Schemes 
(PASs). In others NHS England may as the national service 
commissioner elect to specify the amount it is prepared to pay for 
the treatment of a given number of NHS patients. 
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Alongside the centrally led purchasing of treatments, 
enhanced drug targeting is also driving interest in the 
concept of ‘personalised care’. This by definition requires 
clinical excellence in the shape of sensitivity to variations in 
individuals’ treatment responses. Hence pharmaceutical 
procurement programmes fit for the 21st Century must 
constantly seek to balance affordability concerns and 
the financial advantages of ‘one size fits all’ treatment 
options with an awareness of the potential for optimised 
pharmaceutical care strategies that are tailored to meet 
each individual’s needs in order to improve outcomes, 
and to maximise the welfare linked returns to health 
service investment.
Policy drivers and 
procurement systems
Well informed public procurement strategies help drive 
quality improvements and economic growth. Using 
the purchasing power of States for the public good – 
which includes encouraging fair competition, promoting 
innovation, protecting the environment and obtaining 
maximum direct benefit from taxation funded spending 
– was the fundamental aim of the European Public 
Procurement Directive. It was transposed into UK (English, 
Welsh and Northern Irish) law as the Public Contracts 
Regulation in February 2015. Additional Regulations on 
concession contracts and utilities were passed by the 
UK Parliament in March 2016. Further aspects of the 
Procurement Directive’s goals are considered in Box 1.
Despite the possible long term consequences of the 
recent ‘Brexit’ referendum result, in the next few years 
no significant changes in procurement policies and 
practices are likely to result from it. Although international 
companies and other investors may no longer see 
London – or England more broadly – as a valued 
gateway to the EU market, it will remain vital for Britain to 
continue to offer a desirable setting for research and the 
introduction of new products and services.
If the UK exits the single market one result will almost 
certainly be an end to the promotion of and access 
to British public contracts for companies resident in 
EU countries, and vica-versa. Yet even in this case it 
is possible that mechanisms to allow the continuation 
of trading activities could be instituted via a future 
‘deal’ covering both goods and services provision. 
Developments along these lines have been discussed 
in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(TTIP) negotiations between the US and the EU, albeit 
progress in this context has been slow and may be at 
some point be halted altogether.
Some observers are predicting that the British economy 
will slow, or might even enter a recession, in 2017. If this 
proves to be the case procurement strategies could gain 
increased attention for two main reasons. Firstly, a drop 
in tax receipts would in time be likely to herald further 
fiscal belt-tightening and public spending curbs, leading 
to the possible use of public procurement interventions 
to drive down costs. However, the consequential 
impact of this on competition, choice and added-
Figure	1:	Total	NHS	medicines	spending	at	manufacturers’	prices	as	a	
percentage	of	all	NHS	spending	and	GDP,	UK,	selected	years
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value generation might in such circumstances prove 
regressive. A second, more positive, possibility could 
therefore involve the use of public procurement policies 
in various sectors as strategic tools for encouraging 
innovation and investment in Britain.
Regardless of the impacts of the 2016 referendum 
decision, both the UK and the European Union still 
face significant challenges in overcoming the aftermath 
of the 2008 financial crisis and responding effectively 
to fast changing world conditions. It is probable, for 
example, that 21st century ‘mega-trends’ such as the 
growing ‘electronic connectedness’ between people 
and increasingly rapid flows of capital and information 
across national and regional borders will facilitate shifts 
in the global economic centre of gravity towards the 
emergent economies of Asia and elsewhere. At the 
same time population ageing brought about by low birth 
rates and coupled with extended life expectancy will also 
create new needs and opportunities in every part of the 
world. These will change health care requirements and 
the provisions made to meet them, and further increase 
the importance of improving productivity in all sectors of 
the ‘mature’ economies.
Such observations link back to the role of procurement 
policies in supporting innovation as well as in curbing 
costs. In seeking to respond to macro-level challenges 
the European Commission published the EU 2020 
Growth Strategy in 2010. It confirmed the policy direction 
identified in the 2006 ‘Aho Report’ and the advantages 
of developing a ‘smart growth’ economy based on 
knowledge building and innovation as one of three key 
objectives.3 Targets relating to achieving this include 
investing 3 per cent of the EU’s GDP in R&D by 2020 – 
the 2014 average was 2 per cent.
The UK is presently committed to delivering this strategy, 
though Britain lags behind other large economies with 
respect to investment in R&D. The latter currently stands 
at 1.7 per cent of GDP for the nation as a whole (ONS, 
2016). This compares to 4.1 per cent in South Korea, 3.5 
per cent in Japan, 2.9 per cent in Germany, 2.8 per cent 
in the US and 2.3 per cent in France (Eurostat, 2016). 
Such data highlight the fact that despite initiatives like, for 
3 The other two being ‘sustainable growth: promoting a more 
resource efficient, greener and more competitive economy’; 
and ‘inclusive growth: fostering a high-employment economy 
delivering social and territorial cohesion.’ 
Box	1.	The	2014	EU	Procurement	Directive	–	supporting	economic	success	by	‘buying	innovative’
In 2005 European Heads of State met in the UK at what 
came to be known as the ‘Hampton Court Summit’. 
They decided that more attention should be paid to 
the challenges of globalisation, one of which links to 
supporting research and industrial innovation. This 
subsequently led the European Commission to ask a 
group chaired by the former Prime Minister of Finland, 
Esko Aho, to assess the situation and suggest ways 
of boosting Europe’s performance. The resultant Aho 
Report (European Communities, 2006) identified an 
urgent need to ‘act before it is too late’. Its proposals 
involved ‘the creation of innovation friendly markets’ 
as well as increasing R&D spending and fostering ‘a 
culture which celebrates innovation’.
It was this initiative which in large part prompted the 
development of the legislative package on public 
purchasing contained in the revised 2014 Procurement 
Directive. The fundamental aim of the latter is to help 
ensure sustainable economic growth. Even if the UK is 
to eventually leave the single market this objective will 
remain at the centre of the national policy agenda.
As discussed in the main text, an important element 
of the strategy adopted was its encouragement of the 
‘Most Economically Advantageous Tender’ (MEAT) 
approach. Through this public authorities ought to be 
able to place an increased emphasis on product quality 
and entire life-cycle cost optimisation, as against price 
minimisation focused purchasing. The future challenge 
facing organisations like the NHS relates to putting this 
good intention into practice in ways that are consistent 
with sometimes conflicting public interests in immediate 
cost saving (which often urgent end can overwhelm 
other objectives) as opposed to seeking long term 
welfare and economic development. The Directive’s 
other important goals included:
•	simplifying	 rules	and	procedures	 in	order	save	
not	only	money	but	also	time. For example, in areas 
where competition is difficult to achieve it introduced 
‘light touch’ flexibilities which allow purchasers to 
enter into dialogue with potential suppliers without 
going through a full procurement process involving 
what is known as ‘prior publication’;
•	encouraging	 the	 formation	 of	 Innovation	
Partnerships	 between	 public	 and	 private	
organisations	 in	 contexts	 where	 there	 is	 a	
recognised	 need	 for	 new	 and	 more	 effective	
products. Looking forwards, one opportunity 
for the NHS could be (in order to strengthen the 
implementation of MEAT based purchasing) to 
accept that innovation in health care also depends on 
improved practices, and to recognise the roles that 
private sector partners play in supporting care quality 
improvement; and
•	extending	 opportunities	 for	 small	 and	medium	
size	enterprises	(SMEs)	to	win	income	from	large	
public	 tenders. This can be achieved through, for 
instance, dividing contracts into lots and monitoring 
performance in this and other fields.
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instance, Innovate UK and the creation of 11 so-called 
‘catapult centres’ intended to support rapid progress in 
key research areas, Britain has even within the EU lacked 
a world-class record in overall research funding.
Outside biomedicine linked areas this country’s record 
in translating fundamental research into the supply of 
commercially successful ‘high technology’ goods is also 
patchy. The UK trade balance with the rest of the world 
with regard to the latter is negative. Pharmaceuticals 
can be regarded as an exception to this generally 
disappointing picture (Box 2). But for the purposes of 
this analysis it can be argued that unless communities 
are prepared to spend adequately on not only publicly 
and charitably funded basic research but also on science 
based products offered on their domestic markets they 
may in time lose out to more favourable environments.
Medicines Purchasing in the English NHS
Policy makers have become increasingly aware of the 
leverage public spending can have in changing business 
practices. Over and above the benefits already referred 
to, high quality procurement strategies can serve as tools 
to promote transparency and discourage corruption, 
and improve business to business transaction standards 
in fields such as late payment avoidance and taxation 
related fraud reduction. In Managing Public Money (July 
2013, revised August 2015) HM Treasury (2015) set out 
principles for good procurement across Government in 
ways consistent with national and EU Law and World 
Trade Organisation (WTO) agreements. It reiterates the 
view that obtaining value for money ‘means securing the 
best mix of quality and effectiveness for the least outlay 
over the period of use of the goods or services bought. 
It is not about minimising up front prices.’
This document then goes on to say that ‘whole life 
cost’ rather than lowest purchase price is a key factor 
in determining value. For example, if one product is 
significantly more durable than another or if in the health 
arena a ‘product plus service’ offer is cost effectively 
associated with superior long term outcomes this should 
guide buying decisions, even if immediate costs are 
raised.
In May 2012 the Department of Health published NHS 
Procurement: Raising our Game (RoG). This provided 
the NHS with guidance on steps to be taken to improve 
procurement in the NHS. It aimed to ‘modernise 
procurement in the NHS, take advantage of its enormous 
buying power, ensure value for money for taxpayers, 
develop more productive relationships with industry, 
and provide patients with better access to the very best 
services, technologies and medicines.’ More recently 
Lord Carter of Coles (Department of Health, 2016) 
emphasised the scale of the savings that enhanced 
procurement practices can generate in the hospital 
sector, which utilises two thirds of all NHS resources. 
He highlighted the significance of pharmacy in not only 
assuring NHS medicines supply but also optimising their 
clinical application. From an economic perspective the 
gains achievable from better drug usage often outweigh 
savings to be achieved via means like price cuts.
Pharmacy opportunities
Historically, pharmacists were central to making 
medicines until the period between the First and Second 
World Wars. Subsequently, as the twentieth century 
continued to unfold, they took on the role of purchasing 
finished pharmaceutical products from manufacturers 
and distributing them to the public via community 
and individual hospital pharmacies. But in the modern 
Box	2	The	Pharmaceutical	Industry	as	a	UK	National	Asset
Spending on medicines and allied products by the NHS is 
sometimes presented as being only a cost to taxpayers. 
However, apart from the health gains their products 
generate, recent data show that British and other 
pharmaceutical companies deliver what economist term 
a gross value of around £8 billion to the UK, along with 
a £3 billion positive contribution to the balance of trade.
The research based pharmaceutical industry accounts for 
about 25 per cent of all UK private sector R&D spending 
(pharmaceutical companies currently spend some £4 
billion a year on British based projects) and employs over 
70,000 people. Although this is a relatively small workforce 
number compared with areas such as high street retail, it 
means that in per capita terms pharmaceutical company 
employees contribute more to the UK economy than 
those working in any other major sector. Industry returns 
also contribute to pension funds and the work undertaken 
by Universities and voluntary sector organisations.
Domestically, the UK is already a relatively low spender 
on pharmaceuticals. It is possible that the NHS will in 
future identify new ways of spending less on products 
such as branded medicines. This could generate not 
only health sector savings but also some costs for the 
wider UK economy.
Were the contributions of assets like the UK based 
pharmaceutical industry to decline in the post Brexit 
era the overall NHS budget might also have to fall, 
leading to more pressures on care standards and 
costs. Such observations underline the importance of 
ensuring that in all areas of medicines procurement 
and supply strategy appropriate mechanisms are 
in place to prevent the misuse of single-purchaser 
powers in ways that undermine public interests in 
ensuring that short term health service cost savings 
are not pursued at an undue price for the community 
as a whole.
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context clinical pharmacy is becoming more important. 
The expertise of pharmacists in knowing what medicines 
to buy from which sources still has value. Yet a range 
of additional institutional mechanisms and practitioner 
skills are now involved in controlling the prices paid for 
pharmaceuticals and the volumes purchased, as well 
as regulating their quality and overall cost to the health 
service and the tax payer.
Notwithstanding discounts, public spending on NHS 
medicines currently stands at around £16 billion, or some 
13 per cent of total health service costs in England (2016 
gross figures). Some 75 per cent of this sum is spent 
on branded medicines, with the remainder meeting 
the cost of generics and so-called ‘specials’ (ABPI, 
2016). Of the total quantum of medicines dispensed 
every year a little over half by value are now prescribed 
and supplied through primary care. The remainder are 
hospital pharmacy provided. This last proportion has 
been gradually increasing since the start of the 1990s, 
when it was only a little over 20 per cent.
The available evidence indicates that the UK is in overall 
terms one of the lower priced markets for medicines in 
Western Europe. Its total spending on pharmaceuticals 
expressed as a percentage of national wealth has 
been relatively well controlled, albeit that as the costs 
of primary care medicines have declined hospital drug 
budgets have been placed under new stresses via a 
combination of spending restraints and the advent of 
new opportunities for treating seriously ill people.
Ever since the creation of the NHS there has been 
national level recognition of the value of pharmaceuticals 
to both public health and the economy as a whole. This 
is not least because of their export potential. Balancing 
the need for health care affordability and industrial 
and commercial success has been central to the UK 
Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme (PPRS) since 
its inception in the 1960s4. Despite criticisms made by 
bodies such as the Office of Fair Trading (OFT, 2007) 
at a time when there was political pressure for the 
institution of a more ‘product by product’ focused 
approach to determining pharmaceutical pricing and 
costs, it can be argued that the PPRS approach has had 
a number of unique strengths. They exist in relation to 
limiting the total amount of money spent by the NHS on 
medicines and allied products and rewarding innovation 
without imposing needless costs or damaging the 
pharmaceutical industry in this country or more widely 
(Taylor and Maynard, 1990).
4 The origins of modern PPRS can be dated back to 1957, when 
what was at first called the Voluntary Price Regulation Scheme 
(VPRS) was established. It initially linked domestic and export 
prices, on the assumption that ‘non-market’ NHS willingness to 
pay should be guided by world free market standards. However, 
since the formation of the PPRS in the 1960s it evolved as 
a relatively tightly managed system for controlling corporate 
profitability and industrial activity costs.
Capping total outlays
The PPRS is a non-contractual agreement negotiated 
by the Association of British Pharmaceutical Industry 
(ABPI) on behalf of its participating members with the 
Department of Health, acting with a UK wide brief. Today, 
it is the primary tool for managing branded medicines 
costs in the UK. It is normally re-negotiated every five 
years and the 2014 version will terminate at the end of 
2018.
The PPRS regulates the income that companies can 
achieve on sales to the NHS, rather than controlling 
individual products’ launch prices directly. Yet it does not 
guarantee any given amount of return. The calculation 
of permissible company earnings involves setting a 
range of allowances covering R&D, manufacturing 
costs, information, sales and marketing, and general 
administrative costs. Unless exemptions have been 
agreed because separate supply contracts have been 
signed the PPRS applies to all branded pharmaceutical 
products sold to the NHS, with or without patent 
protection. It covers vaccines, blood products and 
biotechnology products including biosimilars, as well as 
more conventional medicines. By contrast, non-branded 
generic medicines are not covered by the PPRS, in large 
part because it has been (in rare instances questionably) 
assumed that competitive forces will keep their prices 
within appropriate boundaries.
The 2014 PPRS reaffirmed both the Department of 
Health’s and the ABPI’s support for the approach 
described in ‘Innovation, Health & Wealth’ (IHW), the 
DH’s 2011 strategy for developing an “NHS defined by 
its commitment to innovation, demonstrated both in its 
support for research and its success in the rapid adoption 
and diffusion of the best, transformative, most innovative 
ideas, products, services and clinical practice.” Amongst 
other innovations the 2014 agreement established UK 
PharmaScan as a NICE hosted data base. It helps 
both NHS organisations and registered companies 
understand the likely financial and health impacts of new 
products before they reach the market. However, the 
most important facet of the current PPRS is arguably 
that, over and above profit and cost limits, it limits the 
total amount of money that pharmaceutical products 
covered by it cost the NHS. ‘Overspends’ are returned 
to the DH (Box 3).
NICE’s role
Over and above the PPRS, the National Institute for 
Health and Care Excellence has since 1999 played an 
important role in limiting medicine prices low through, 
amongst other functions such as the production of 
evidence based treatment guidelines appraising the cost 
effectiveness of selected innovations. On the basis of 
such calculations NICE may or may not recommend their 
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use in the NHS. NICE is not directly involved in setting 
prices, and nor does it seek to determine whether or not 
the NHS can afford to implement its recommendations.
There is some controversy regarding the extent to which 
NICE’s interventions have been cost saving for the NHS 
as a whole. However, the organisation does play a clear 
role in limiting the amounts spent on some individual 
products via its influence on the terms of Patient Access 
Schemes (PASs). These can foster better care but in large 
part serve as mechanisms for companies to discount the 
de facto prices paid by the NHS for the use of innovative 
treatments without cutting their list prices.
Promoting timely access to better 
treatments
The work of the Accelerated Access Review of 
Innovative Medicines and Medical Technologies (AAR) is 
potentially important in this last context. Initially launched 
in November 2014 and chaired by Sir Hugh Taylor, 
the aim of the AAR is to “…make recommendations 
to government on reforms to accelerate access for 
NHS patients to innovative medicines and medical 
technologies (including devices and diagnostics), 
making our country the best place in the world to 
design, develop and deploy these products” (AAR, 
2014). The review has looked at, firstly, how regulation 
can be adapted to speed up the assessment of new 
medicines and devices; secondly, how reimbursement 
can evolve to aid innovation and how health economic 
evaluation should consider new advances in genomics 
and informatics; and, finally, how the NHS can support 
medical innovation through mechanisms like specialist 
commissioning.
This initiative raises a number of important questions 
in areas like how best patients and service users can 
and should be involved in the processes of therapeutic 
innovation. But from a medicines and allied product 
procurement perspective its most important implications 
are linked to the need to weigh the benefits of price 
minimisation against a full awareness of the value 
of continuing to provide incentives for investing in 
biomedical innovation, and for forming partnerships 
aimed at optimising the outcomes derived from both 
new and established forms of treatment. In what 
may become an increasingly testing fiscal and public 
spending environment the importance of achieving a 
robust balance between affordability and research and 
development investment will probably grow.
It would be understandable if in the next five to ten years 
NHS budget holders with procurement responsibilities 
were to become increasingly focused on reducing costs, 
regardless of other concerns. Yet from a high level policy 
perspective this could risk exacerbating rather than 
relieving the nation’s long term economic challenges.
Box	3.	The	Pharmaceutical	Price	Regulation	Scheme
From its original establishment as the Voluntary Price 
Regulation Scheme (VPRS) in the late 1950s through 
to its current format, the UK PPRS has evolved to 
embody a progressively more sophisticated set of 
mechanisms for moderating total NHS spending on 
branded medicines. Some critics argue that it is no 
longer needed, in part because the costs of medicines 
purchased via tendered contracts are not normally 
included in the PPRS returns made to the Department 
of Health. But its proponents believe that it helps to 
deliver cost restraint without counter-productively 
damaging public and private interests in pharmaceutical 
innovation.
The PPRS links the research, manufacturing, marketing 
and management costs incurred by companies 
supplying pharmaceuticals to the NHS to the returns on 
the capital that they employ. It places ceilings on both 
profits and their outlays in areas such as promotion, 
while allowing companies the power to set the prices 
of innovations. The current version of the Scheme also 
controls the overall amount of money PPRS companies 
can earn on sales to the health service, with ‘over-
spends’ being returned to the Department of Health.
The arrangements governing these re-payments have 
been controversial in England because the funds 
involved have not been visibly returned to the hospitals 
or commissioners responsible for making the original 
payments. This may be seen as creating perverse 
incentives for care providers not to invest in innovative 
treatments, even when the net cost to the health 
service of using better therapies is negligible.
The situation has also since 2000 been complicated by 
the existence of NICE, and its indirect role in fostering 
a form of value based pricing for selected products. 
However, the most important point to stress is that the 
PPRS explicitly acknowledges that it is not concerned 
with price minimisation but rather seeking to achieve a 
robust balance between cost control and investment 
in innovation. Whatever the future of the Scheme itself, 
the preservation of this principle in all aspects of NHS 
pharmaceutical purchasing should arguably be seen as 
a desirable goal.
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Purchasing for improved 
outcomes – the MEAT 
challenge
The NHS in England currently costs in the order of £120 
billion annually. Some two thirds of this spending total 
takes the form of professional and other staff salaries and 
associated outlays. Yet most of the remainder involves 
the procurement of externally produced goods and 
services from many thousands of different suppliers5. 
Although when all discounting is allowed for drugs and 
related items account for little more than a tenth of 
overall health care costs, pharmaceuticals represent the 
second largest discrete NHS expenditure category after 
labour payments.
In the community setting medicines and allied products 
are supplied via local pharmacies. As already described, 
they purchase most of the pharmaceuticals they dispense 
via national level wholesalers within the price limits set 
by the ‘Drug Tariff’ in the case of generic medicines 
and the PPRS in the case of most branded products. 
However, supplies are also obtained from other sources. 
Community pharmacists are encouraged to pursue 
discounts on the medicines they obtain for NHS supply, 
albeit there is a ‘clawback’ system in place which seeks 
to ensure that the taxpayer enjoys a reasonable share of 
such savings/earnings.
In the hospital sector expertise in tender-based medicines 
purchasing has accumulated since the 1950s, initially 
in individual hospital settings and subsequently at the 
regional and national levels. Pharmacists and their local 
procurement team colleagues have also been central 
to this aspect of medicines buying, although recent 
changes in the commissioning and working of the NHS 
Specialist Pharmacy Service (NHS England, 2014) may 
well lead to further adaptations. The past involvement 
of local hospital pharmacists and other staff may on 
occasions have helped to facilitate clinician ‘buy-in’ to 
cost saving procurement decisions. Large scale, more 
impersonal, systems may save additional money, and 
strengthen the overall NHS’s bargaining position relative 
to drug suppliers.
Tendering processes
Tendering for generic drug supplies has taken place in 
the NHS for over 30 years, and is also well established 
in many areas of branded medicines purchasing. It is of 
particular value in contexts when competition between 
like or substitutable items is not generating desirable 
5 The Carter Review of Operational Productivity and Performance in 
English NHS Acute Hospitals sampled the procurement activities 
of 22 Trusts. They found they used 30,000 suppliers, 20,000 
different product brands, 400,000 manufacturer product codes 
and more than 7,000 people able to place an order. 
economies. Tendering proposals should have a clear 
scope, and be robustly linked to the budgets available. 
Supply durations should be well-defined, as should 
specifications for the goods and services that successful 
providers will be expected to deliver. Problems associated 
with tendering and allied activities can include:
•	 purchasers and/or policy makers having inadequate 
knowledge of the products or services to be procured, 
particularly in ‘real world’ contexts and that of end-
point users’ highest priorities;
•	 purchasers lacking the professional skills required to 
secure best-value;
•	 lack of transparency on the part of suppliers and 
difficulties linked to inadequate awareness of 
tender calls, resulting in failures to ensure adequate 
competition; and
•	 failures to employ procedures best suited to obtaining 
optimal outcomes.
The awarding of contracts based on price is normally 
approached by either comparing the initial capital costs 
of accepting alternative bids, or through evaluations of 
rival products’ and services’ whole life projected costs. 
As has already been discussed, the problem with the 
former approach is that immediate price advantages 
alone do not guarantee best value. ‘Whole life’ analyses 
allow more consideration of the total costs of choosing 
one product or service over another, but even these can 
miss important aspects of value.
Because of growing awareness of the downsides of 
simplistic ‘lowest price’ purchasing strategies there 
has in recent years been a move towards adopting 
more sophisticated approaches, as reflected in the 
requirements of the 2014 Procurement Directive. Most 
Economically Advantageous Tender (MEAT) oriented 
strategies seek to take into consideration multiple 
criteria based on the qualities of the products or services 
available. These may include:
•	 price or cost, using cost-effectiveness based 
approaches;
•	 technical merits, such as storage properties and 
functional properties;
•	 safety related variables;
•	 aesthetic characteristics;
•	 accessibility;
•	 social and environmental characteristics;
•	 innovative characteristics;
•	 after-sales service and technical assistance availability; 
and
•	 delivery conditions, such as supply dates and 
processes. (See, for example, Association of Colleges, 
2016).
Figure	2.	NHS	medicines	pricing	and	procurement	in	England:	2016	overview	
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Weightings can be applied to each of the criteria used 
and an overall score on the suitability of the supplier 
and the products or services being purchased then 
calculated. However, this can in practice be difficult to 
achieve in a manner acceptable to all the stakeholders 
involved in procurement processes. Legal restraints and 
related fears can also inhibit behaviours. Partly because 
of this the forces favouring ‘lowest price at any cost’ 
purchasing as opposed to value-based procurement 
can be hard to overcome.
This might, for example, have on occasions proven to 
be the case in respect to providing social care for elderly 
and other vulnerable individuals. Achieving due sensitivity 
to both personal needs and wider community interests 
may be even more difficult in fields like medicines supply, 
unless an appropriate balance between serving patient 
and public welfare focused professional interests on the 
one hand and the pursuit of cost reduction targets on 
the other can be maintained.
Centralised direction
Tendering has had a significant impact on medicine prices 
in secondary care, not least in fields where previously they 
varied widely between localities because of factors such 
as differing demand volumes and purchasing expertise 
levels. As already described it can be undertaken locally 
and regionally, but is increasingly being organised 
nationally with (in England) the support of a central DH 
procurement team called the Commercial Medicines 
Unit (CMU). Centralised purchasing has arguably been 
most productively employed in areas such as HIV and 
haemophilia treatment, where relatively low volumes of 
high unit cost medicines are supplied to patients via 
limited numbers of specialist centres.
The CMU was originally part of the NHS Supply Agency 
and subsequently the Purchasing and Supplies Agency 
(PASA). It has since then been taken forward as a part of 
the Department of Health’s Procurement Investment and 
Commercial Division, although recently there have been 
suggestions that it should be hosted by NHS England. In 
addition to facilitating the acquisition of both branded and 
generic medicines for hospital use, the CMU supports the 
procurement of homecare – where there have reportedly 
been some recent concerns about the withdrawal of a 
major provider – and also vaccines6. Other bodies that 
play important roles in NHS medicines purchasing include 
the National Pharmaceutical Supplies Group (NPSG), 
which is made up of secondary care chief pharmacists 
together with a range of other senior colleagues, and the 
Pharmacy Market Support Group (PMSG – see Figure 2).
6 Vaccines are purchased centrally in bulk by the Department of 
Health, as are products to be stockpiled for emergency use and 
supplies of Intravenous Immunoglobulin	(IVIG).	This last is a blood 
product. From a procurement perspective the special status of 
IVIG can be linked to historic concerns about supply continuity 
and the impacts of the introduction of bioengineered blood factors 
on the economics of its production.
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The English medicines procurement structure can be 
expected to evolve alongside that of the NHS Specialist 
Pharmacy Service. The PMSG’s role has been described 
as being centrally concerned with implementing the 
strategic plans agreed by the NPSG and to monitor 
locality level performance and compliance. PMSG 
subgroups have been responsible for differing segments 
of the medicines market, including generic products, 
biosimilars, pharmacy business technology and branded 
medicines. It is of note regarding the latter that branded 
medicines subject to central tendering are normally 
removed from the scope of PPRS returns in order to 
avoid manufacturers facing a double burden of price 
reductions and profit limitations.
It would be outside the scope of this report to offer a 
detailed analysis of how tendering processes must be 
conducted in order to comply with EU and UK public 
procurement laws. But in outline the present situation 
is that they should initially be advertised in order to 
communicate the identity of the procuring authority and 
describe the type of good/services being sought, the 
duration of the contracts to be offered, how awards will 
adjudicated and any specific conditions with which a 
successful supplier must comply. Above a certain value 
threshold tenders have to be openly advertised through 
the OJEU system, although this will probably change if 
Britain leaves the European single market.
Box	4.	The	Value	of	Multiple-supplier	
Framework	Agreements
Multiple-supplier Framework Agreements embody 
all the terms and conditions for purchases agreed 
between a contracting authority and its suppliers 
without necessarily placing an obligation on the 
purchaser to buy any given overall volume of goods or 
services. According to one leading law firm ‘a Multi-
supplier Framework allows a contracting authority to 
select from a number of suppliers for its requirements, 
helping to ensure that each purchase represents best 
value.’
Contracts are formed and are subject to procurement 
regulations once relevant products or services have 
been purchased (that is, once ‘call-offs’ are made). 
According to the now dissolved Office of Government 
Commerce ‘the benefit is that, because authorities 
are not tied to the Agreements, they are free to use 
the Frameworks when they provide value for money, 
but to go elsewhere if they do not.’ In the NHS context 
MsFAs also help to preserve clinical and patient choice 
within a structured price and cost environment. If the 
process involved allows branded medicine suppliers 
to charge at different levels depending on the amount 
of goods purchased from them in any given period 
they too enjoy an element of enhanced security. Their 
unit returns will tend to be inversely related to the total 
volume supplied.
Following this, a pre-qualification phase allows potential 
suppliers to register their interest and demonstrate 
eligibility for participation. Companies meeting the 
relevant criteria receive an Invitation to Tender (ITT), 
accompanied by further information. The final stages 
of the procurement process consist of reviewing and 
assessing the tender offers against the stated criteria 
and notifying the successful and unsuccessful suppliers. 
A mandatory standstill period of 10 days allows any 
supplier that feels it has been unfairly treated to challenge 
the decisions made.
As is explored further below, different tendering 
process designs exist. Selecting the most appropriate 
methodology enhances the bargaining power of 
procurers. In addition, Multi-supplier Framework 
Agreements (see Box 4) can ensure flexibility for 
purchasers operating in complex settings like the NHS, 
where each individual body offering a given service may 
need varying amounts of alternative products.
Recent developments in procurement techniques, 
in part made possible by modern information and 
communications technology, have strengthened the 
positions of drug and allied product buyers as against 
their suppliers. Yet there is evidence from other sectors 
that in some circumstances the use of ‘reverse auction7’ 
and other advanced tendering processes can damage 
useful aspects of buyer-supplier relationships and so 
perhaps threaten supply continuity or aspects of service 
quality. The next section of this report highlights some of 
the challenges to be overcome in relation to a selection 
of ‘real world’ examples drawn from the experience of 
the NHS in England.
Providing Specialised 
Treatment for Children and 
Adults
Specialised care is an umbrella term which refers to 
services provided in a limited number of hospital and 
allied centres, typically for patients with relatively rare 
conditions requiring high cost interventions. Those in 
need of such medical and related health professional 
support include many of the most vulnerable children 
and adults in the country. They are living with conditions 
ranging from, for example, renal failure and forms of 
incontinence requiring corrective surgery through to 
diseases such as childhood cancers, cystic fibrosis 
and early-life mental health problems, as well as life 
threatening blood disorders and infections like HIV 
and Hepatitis C. A proportion of the people with these 
7 Reverse auctions involve iterative processes in which rival providers 
of goods and services make bids relating to the amount they are 
willing to accept for given volumes of substitutable product, at the 
end of which the lowest cost provider wins either the entire contract 
or the largest share of the supply contract on offer. 
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last diseases need treatment for them because until a 
decade or so ago they received from the NHS products 
for haemophilia and linked conditions that contained live 
viral contaminants.
Specialised services currently cost NHS England 
approaching £16 billion a year. This total (around 15 per 
cent of which is being spent on high cost medicines 
and associated products) is comparable to the health 
service’s gross spending on pharmaceuticals of all 
types. The English NHS reforms that came into effect 
in 2013 imposed some re-organisational costs and 
had disruptive impacts in various areas, including the 
commissioning of specialised services (National Audit 
Office, 2016). This created considerable concerns 
about financial control. Public attention was particularly 
directed to the cost of the Cancer Drugs Fund (CDF), 
albeit it accounted for no more than 3 per cent of NHS 
England’s specialised commissioning outlays in 2015. 
Emergency measures to stem over-spends may in some 
instances have adversely influenced the quality of care 
available to NHS users.
However, fit-for-purpose specialist care commissioning 
arrangements are now emerging. Six National 
Programmes of Care (NPoCs) are in place, each of 
which is led by a Board charged with coordinating and 
prioritising the activities undertaken within their respective 
fields. Each NPoC is associated with a number – typically 
around 10 – of Clinical Reference Groups (CRGs) that 
enable clinicians to advise on how services should be 
provided in their areas of expertise and can support the 
functioning of Framework Agreements. The six National 
Programmes cover:
•	 internal medicine, including specialist circulatory 
disease care;
•	 cancer;
•	 mental health;
•	 trauma;
•	 women and children, which includes a range of 
congenital disorders; and
•	 blood and infections.
Purchasing blood factor products for 
people living with haemophilia
Haemophilia is located in the last of these groups. It is 
in fact a small set of related inherited disorders. In the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries haemophilia 
received more attention than might have been expected 
for a rare condition because of the relative ease with 
which bleeding events can be diagnosed and the 
dramatic impacts it had on several of the Royal families 
of Europe, most notably that of the last Romanoff Tsar.
Haemophilias are genetic disorders which impair normal 
clotting, and so to differing degrees render affected 
individuals subject to damaging, sometimes fatal 
or permanently disabling, episodes of bleeding. For 
instance, inadequately treated individuals may suffer joint 
destruction which is not amenable to surgical correction. 
The more common forms are sex linked because they 
involve mutations in genes on the X chromosome, of 
which men only have one copy. They are only very rarely 
diagnosed in women, who need to have both their gene 
copies (alleles) affected before experiencing symptomatic 
illness. Females much more often act as carriers, passing 
the disease on to one in every two of their male children.
The most common form is Haemophilia A. It affects about 
5,000 individuals in the UK and can be treated by giving 
subjects replacement blood Factor VIII. This can be either 
extracted from donated blood or produced artificially via 
recombinant technologies. The same applies in the case of 
Haemophilia B, which is rarer – there are about 1,000 cases 
in this country – and is caused by Factor IX deficiency8.
Typically, people who have one per cent or less of the 
blood Factor level typically present in healthy individuals 
are classified as having severe haemophilia, although 
in some cases patients have abnormally formed blood 
Factors rather than low levels. Those with 1-5 per cent 
of the reference level are likely to be diagnosed as having 
moderate disease, albeit some independent authorities 
argue that the ‘severe’ threshold would be better set at 
3 per cent or less of the expected factor level (Kenny, 
2016). Men and on rare occasions women who have 
between 5-40 per cent of the normal Factor level are 
normally classified as living with mild disease.
Up until the start of the 1960s boys born with severe 
haemophilia were unlikely to live far into their teens – 
the median age of death was about 10 years. But from 
about that time onwards blood Factor concentrates 
derived from donated supplies (including commercially 
sourced blood from the US) became available. Average 
life expectancy for people with severe haemophilia 
quickly rose to over 50 years. However, from the 1980s 
onwards increasing numbers of patients in the UK and 
other developed countries contracted HIV and/or other 
iatrogenically transmitted (that is, treatment caused) 
infections, including various forms of hepatitis.
Despite the health hazards known to be associated with 
conventionally sourced biological products the NHS was, 
in part because of cost concerns, relatively slow to adopt 
the use of recombinant Factor VIII and IX products. These 
8 Haemophilia C is due to a mutation that is not located on the X 
chromosome, and hence is found equally in males and females. 
It involves reduced levels of factor XI, and is like a number of 
other genetic disorders unusually common in Jewish people with 
East European backgrounds who in certain phases of history – 
like many Royals – traditionally lived with an unusually restricted 
choice of reproductive partners. It is likely that Queen Victoria was 
born with a spontaneous mutation that gave rise to Haemophilia B 
in some of her male descendants.
14 Tender Loving Care?
molecules, synthesised by bioengineered bacteria, first 
entered the US and EU pharmaceutical markets in the 
early 1990s. However, by the turn of the current century 
there was growing UK patient and professional awareness 
of the safety advantages of recombinant treatments. From 
2005 onwards a new tendering approach was taken in 
order to support the procurement of such medicines for 
all in need of them in an affordable manner. It sought to 
ensure nationwide access to good quality supplies at a 
cost acceptable to the NHS.
The details of the procurement strategy adopted in 
three phases in the period 2004 and 2014 between 
have been described by Hay (2013). Developed with 
the close involvement of doctors working in specialised 
Haemophilia Centres across the country and supported 
by the Department of Health’s Commercial Medicines 
Unit, this utilised a ‘reverse e-auction’ methodology. 
This incremental process required rival manufacturers 
to, over a period of time, bid down against each other 
for differently sized portions of the NHS requirement 
for recombinant Factor VIII and IX products. At the end 
of this process the lowest price supplier meeting the 
specified quality criteria was awarded the largest volume 
contract, with higher priced suppliers being awarded 
lower sales volumes.
This initiative (along with other tendering based 
procurement approaches pioneered in Ireland and 
elsewhere – see Box 5) is widely regarded as having 
been a success, although reverse e-auction tendering 
is not now widely used as compared to the alternative 
of asking would-be suppliers to submit single ‘sealed-
envelope’ bids indicating the volume-specific prices 
at which they are able to offer their products. A multi-
provider Framework Agreement was subsequently 
established, via which individual Centres in England and 
the other UK nations were made (and remain) free to buy 
from nationally approved suppliers those haemophilia 
treatments their medical staff and their patients believe 
to be most appropriate for meeting their personal needs.
The benefits of centralised procurement should include 
reduced administrative outlays coupled with enhanced 
purchasing power. In the case of haemophilia care it may 
be estimated that annual savings of around a third have 
been secured on an original sales value of approximately 
£150 million, without sacrificing clinical autonomy or 
patient centred care principles in a manner unacceptable 
to the health professionals and NHS users involved. 
At the same time companies supplying Haemophilia 
Centres have a degree of security relating to the sales 
they will achieve during each contractual period, and the 
overall cost to the NHS is kept within a defined envelope.
The purchasing of blood Factor concentrates in the UK 
can therefore be taken to offer a positive example on 
which to build for the future. But a number of cautions 
should be noted. They include:
•	 Haemophilia services are in some respects atypical
Historically, blood products like biologically sourced 
Factor concentrates were not normally purchased via 
pharmacies, but directly by haematology departments 
or non-pharmacist purchasers working on behalf 
of haematologists. Now they are manufactured by 
companies using advanced bio-engineering techniques 
they may arguably be regarded as being more like 
Box	5.	Purchasing	Blood	Products	in	Eire
The Irish Haemophilia Society was founded in 1968 by 
doctors and people living with haemophilia, together 
with their families and friends. They wanted to improve 
the quality of services available. The Society was initially 
influential in the establishment of specialist centres for 
supplying the blood Factor replacement treatments 
then becoming available in volume, and from the 
early 1980s in defending the interests of individuals 
who became infected with HIV as a result of using 
contaminated biological products.
In 2003 the Irish government, with support from and 
the continuing involvement of the Society, established 
a Haemophilia Product Selection & Monitoring 
Advisory Board (HPSMAB) to advise and make 
recommendations on the selection of products for the 
treatment of haemophilia, von Willebrand’s disease 
(which is caused by an abnormal Gene on chromosome 
12 that affects platelet functioning – it is the most 
common form of hereditary blood-clotting disorder) 
and related conditions.  In these contexts it conducts 
National Procurement Tender processes.
To this end the Irish HPSMAB has produced, for 
instance, a pioneering score sheet to facilitate the 
purchasing of Factor VIII products for people living with 
Haemophilia A. This has been recognised as a robust 
example of how the MEAT criteria can in practice be 
implemented by purchasers. It details the weights to be 
given in areas such as safety, technical efficacy, other 
quality variables, supply security and both clinical and 
consumer preferences on top of the price element. The 
latter only accounts for a quarter of the total number of 
points that may be awarded.
This example can be seen as an encouraging illustration 
of what can be achieved in serving even a relatively 
small national population. Its achievement is in large 
part attributable to the committed efforts of the Irish 
Haemophilia Society, although it should also be seen in 
the context of Eire’s relatively strong and highly valued 
pharmaceutical manufacturing sector.
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‘normal pharmaceuticals’, and so more within the 
realm of pharmacy. Even so, specialist haematologists 
can still be regarded as having a unique expertise in 
relation to such products. This atypical background, 
coupled with the need to address the special support 
needs of individuals and families living with haemophilia 
and the unique network of dedicated Centres that has 
been set up to help meet them, may mean that the 
high level of informed engagement shown by members 
of the UK Haemophilia Centre Doctors Organisation in 
the procurement process evolution outlined here could 
prove difficult to replicate in many other areas.
•	 Treatment and purchasing approaches must adapt 
as new therapeutic technologies and strategies 
demonstrate an enhanced outcome potential
For example, the use of blood Factor replacements with 
extended half-lives may open the way to a new balance 
between supplying long-term prophylactic interventions 
on a regular basis (needed in more severe cases, and 
which might benefit an increased number of individuals as 
and when their personal pharmacokinetic and treatment 
response profiles are better understood) and ‘coagulation 
on demand’ care when individuals are suffering identified 
bleeds. Intermittent Factor replacement treatment is 
normally the optimal choice for individuals with moderate 
to mild disease. To the extent that this is the case future, 
potentially more centrally controlled, prescribing and 
linked procurement strategies will when appropriate 
need to be flexible enough to accept higher unit cost 
product usage in order to generate better outcomes and 
release medium to long term financial savings along with 
increased patient wellbeing.
Ultimately, industrial and public investment in haemophilia 
care and areas like gene therapy research should make 
it a fully manageable, even curable, condition. But for 
the moment optimising the use of the range of blood 
factor replacement products available is the only viable 
way forward. One problem to be overcome is the 
development of inhibitors. These are antibodies which 
impair the actions of such treatments in about a third 
of all those receiving them for Haemophilia A, and in 
around 3 per cent of patients with severe to moderate 
Haemophilia B.
At one stage there were fears that switching between 
different products in the pursuit of cost savings could, 
along with individual genetic and variables and differences 
in treatment durations, drive inhibitor expression. 
This risk has now in large part been discounted, and 
the use of immune tolerance therapies (ITTs) can limit 
the harm caused to most individuals. But when the 
precise immunological mechanisms responsible for the 
development of inhibitors have been elucidated and 
if further protective actions are identified purchasing 
processes should seek to ensure good access to 
optimally effective treatment regimens.
•	 Modern commissioning and procurement processes9 
should foster positive provider and end-point user 
partnerships, focused on enhancing individual care 
standards
There is now good evidence that personalised 
approaches to haemophilia care can generate better 
outcomes than less tailored ones. One way to enhance 
capacities to define and deliver good quality care is 
through – in appropriately regulated circumstances – 
pharmaceutical companies responsible for developing 
innovations working in partnership with clinicians to 
optimise treatment practices. This has in the case of 
UK Haemophilia Centre services in the past in part been 
achieved by, for instance, companies contributing to 
the funding of the Haemtrack service – which provides 
patients with a convenient way of recording bleeds and 
other unwanted events alongside treatment information 
– and to the employment of specialist nurses.
Such activities can complement charitable initiatives 
funded by ‘third sector’ organisations and may be 
seen as in line with the spirit of the 2014 European 
Procurement Directive. There is good reason to believe 
that if efforts to improve the treatment and support 
available to people living with haemophilia are made 
in a consistently principled manner (see Box 6) further 
health gains and socio-economic benefits will transpire. 
Yet some industry critics say that all drug prices should 
be stripped down to the minimum viable level, and that 
if the NHS wishes to commission any additional services 
these should be explicitly purchased.
In economic terms the justification for such parsimony 
is partly that it would avoid distortions associated with 
cross-subsidisation. But its advocates could be in danger 
of ignoring the fact that institutional and bureaucratic 
forces can sometimes oppose the introduction of new 
patterns of care for reasons that are not immediately 
commercial yet are nevertheless contrary to the public’s 
best interests. Individuals working in specialised areas 
might on occasions fear that as and when economies 
are made in their fields ‘gain share’ hopes (to the effect 
that savings in pharmaceutical and allied costs will in part 
be returned to the teams and service areas achieving 
lower spending) will not materialise, and their capacity 
to win additional resources for ‘their patients’ will be 
permanently reduced.
In addition, ‘social market’ theorists may argue that 
prohibiting medicine or other product and service makers 
from being actively involved in developing the settings in 
which the potential benefits of the goods they supply are 
translated into reality could be detrimental to patient and 
9 Procurement may be regarded as a policy neutral process that 
is separate from commissioning on the one hand and clinical 
practice and service provision on the other. However, the view 
taken here is that a broader definition of procurement ought to 
accept that a degree of overlap exists between these fields.
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public interests in ways that will be difficult to identify until 
after they have negatively impacted on people’s well-
being. Aspects of this debate are touched on again later 
in this report. However, before that two other specialised 
medicines procurement areas are briefly explored. The 
first relates to the acquisition of treatments for infections 
such as HIV and Hepatitis C. The second is that of anti-
cancer drug supply, which is set to be an increasingly 
important field in the coming decade as progressively 
more effective therapeutic regimens become available.
Protecting population-wide interests and 
maximising the wellbeing of individuals 
with HIV
It is now known that people were suffering from HIV/
AIDS in regions such as the Congo in the early decades 
of the twentieth century and in all probability on a 
sporadic basis before then. But it was not until Africa 
opened up to the outside world that the infection was 
able to spread from rural villages and relatively isolated 
cities such as the Kinshasa of the early 1900s to other 
world regions. AIDS was first recognised in the US and 
Europe at the start of the 1980s. For example, the radical 
social theorist and critic of modern psychiatric medicine, 
Michel Foucault, died of it in 1984, the year after 
pharmaceutical companies began work on producing 
recombinant Factor VIII.
There was originally no treatment available other than 
palliative care for what was at that time in practical 
terms a universally lethal condition. Although initially 
seen as primarily a threat to gay men, fears soon 
emerged that it could rapidly be transmitted to a large 
proportion of the sexually active population. In the 
UK this elicited a powerful public health protection 
response led by Margaret Thatcher’s then Health 
Secretary, Sir Norman Fowler. There was also a 
wave of both private industrial and public investment 
in attempts to develop effective pharmaceutical 
treatments. Following the initial introduction of 
Zidovudine/AZT as an HIV treatment at the end of 
1980s the NHS prioritised the supply of effective HIV 
therapies to all patients in need of them.
Box	6.	‘Tender	Loving	Care’	Principles
The survival and quality of life experienced by children 
and adults living with haemophilia has been radically 
transformed by the improving use of established and 
new pharmaceutical products. Amongst those with 
severe disease average life expectancy in the UK has 
increased from around 10 years in the 1950s to over 
70 today, despite the impact of HIV. However, there is 
still considerably more that could be done to reduce 
disability and distress experienced by individuals 
and families living with haemophilia, and ultimately – 
through interventions like gene therapies – to cure the 
conditions involved.
Further long term investment in fundamental bio-
pharmaceutical/biomedical research and development 
will be vital for achieving this last objective. But more 
immediately progress in generating better outcomes 
for people with bleeding disorders of all types could, as 
organisations like the UK’s Haemophilia Society have 
helped to highlight, result from continuing to apply 
the principles underlying high quality health and social 
care delivery in increasingly rigorous and effective 
ways. (See, for example, Shire, 2016.) In relation to 
haemophilia these can be summarised as:
•	recognising	 and	 effectively	 meeting	 the	 need	
for	personalised	health	care	involving	extended	
access	to	pharmacokinetic	testing,	more	tailored	
dosing	 regimens	 and	 detailed	 personal	 care	
planning	at	every	life	stage. It is important to note, 
for instance, that underlying rates of blood Factor 
breakdown can vary fourfold between individuals, 
and that differences in physical activity rates can also 
impact on bleeding risks;
•	promoting	confidence	 in	 the	availability	of	and	
belief	in	the	value	of	good	quality	care	amongst	
all	service	users,	health	professionals	and	others	
stakeholder	groups. Clinician trust and involvement 
is vital for the promotion of cost effective medicines 
prescribing, while enhancing patient motivation is 
often central to using pharmaceuticals to best effect;
•	recognising	 the	 full	 value	 of	 treatment	
improvements. This relates critically to issues 
such as implementing MEAT based tendering in a 
constructive manner;
•	continuously	 improving	 outcome	 and	 related	
data	 collection. Without this it will be difficult to 
improve therapeutic strategies in sensitive and 
appropriate ways, and to understand in depth the 
benefits that changes in care delivery can generate; 
and
•	ensuring	value	 for	money	 for	 the	NHS	 in	ways	
that	will	foster	further	industrial	and	professional	
success. The pursuit of improved care quality 
without due regard to assuring well-evaluated cost 
effectiveness would be unsustainable. However, so 
too could be pursuing service savings in ways that 
undermine the ability pharmaceutical companies 
and/or the professionals with whom they work to 
fund innovation and seek in co-operation with other 
stakeholders to attain outcomes most desired by 
service users and their wider communities.
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Despite total therapeutic costs of at one stage in 
the order of £10,000 per person per year, HIV/AIDS 
medicines have during the last 20 years been swiftly 
and comprehensively provided via the specialised NHS 
services established to treat people affected by the 
condition. Their appropriate use has not only protected 
individuals living with the virus, but has also helped to 
prevent its transmission to others. Notwithstanding 
concerns that some people with HIV have moved to 
this country from regions such as Africa in the hope of 
receiving better care than would otherwise have been 
available to them, the result of this strategy is that in the 
UK today there are only about 100,000 individuals living 
with the infection (National Aids Trust, 2016).
This is a very much lower relative burden of disease 
than that carried in countries that in the past took a 
less supportive approach to the care of individuals and 
populations at risk of HIV infection, including both the 
US and the Russian Federation. A substantial proportion 
of UK HIV patients live in cities like London and 
Brighton. Services in such locations are unsurprisingly 
high spenders on antiviral treatments, a fact which can 
be taken to underline the need for centrally allocated 
specialist service funding.
The life expectancy of people living with HIV, provided 
they are able to take the medicines prescribed for 
them as recommended, is now comparable to that of 
other healthy members of the community of a similar 
age. However, as HIV infection has shifted from being 
perceived as an acute threat to life to being a chronic 
condition that demands long term management 
tighter controls on treatment expenditures have been 
introduced.
Specialist HIV centres have in recent years operated with 
a ceiling on average per capita drug costs. The current 
figure stands at about £6,000 per patient per annum. It 
is also of note that NHS England has recently questioned 
its ability and/or duty to supply at public cost preventive 
drugs (as opposed to barrier based protectives) 
designed to stop individuals normally seen as having 
voluntarily put themselves at raised risk of exposure to 
HIV from contracting the infection. One NHS England 
spokesperson was recently reported to have said that 
if the NHS was ‘forced’ to pay for an expensive (circa 
£5,000 per annum) medicine for people who cannot 
or will not protect themselves from HIV it could lead to 
children with cystic fibrosis being denied effective new 
treatments.
From a populist standpoint such concerns may well be 
seen as appropriate in the current economic and social 
climate. Yet at the same time such positions to a degree 
parallel the approach of some Eastern European and 
other similarly minded policy makers in past decades. 
They may by a proportion of NHS doctors and other 
UK observers be regarded as a step away from the 
successful British public health strategies established 
during the Thatcher administration. They might also be 
seen as exemplifying the direction that the unchecked 
pursuit of narrowly defined ‘economy’ could in future 
take the health service in England.
As with the haemophilia treatments discussed above, 
the procurement strategy which has to date allowed the 
UK to supply HIV treatment more cost effectively than 
many other developed countries has been based on 
informed clinician involvement and respect for their clinical 
judgement. Through this, Framework Agreements with 
manufacturers have been enabled to function effectively. 
Patients with special needs have access to higher cost 
medicines, while physicians elect to prescribe lower cost 
treatments as and when these can meet patients’ needs. 
Such observations carry important lessons for the future of 
all forms of specialised care and treatment procurement.
Treating Hepatitis C
As with HIV infection, Hepatitis C is a condition for which 
no form of vaccine yet exists. Again as with HIV, various 
viral strains exist and not all are equally amenable to 
treatment. Until recently the available drugs were not 
only costly but of limited effectiveness. However, with 
the launch of medicines such as Sofosbuvir in 2014 
and subsequently other antiviral products with different 
modes of action, it is now possible to deliver 95 per cent 
plus cure rates in settings like the UK.
There are estimated to be over 200,000 people living 
with Hepatitis C in this country (Public Health England, 
2015). The majority are symptom free, and a relatively 
large percentage of individuals carrying the virus are 
undiagnosed. Despite the efforts of organisations 
such as the Hepatitis C Trust, case finding has not to 
date received high priority attention. From an NHS 
perspective this may be linked to the fact that only a 
limited proportion of chronically infected patients suffer 
significant levels of liver and related harm, and that today 
treatment in the later stages of the disease is likely – at 
least in physiological if not psychological terms – to be 
more or less as beneficial as early stage intervention.
It is in addition the case that the new drugs now on the 
world market are expensive as compared with products 
like widely used antibiotics. However, because of their 
curative efficacy NICE has found them to be cost 
effective in a range of contexts. This may have led to 
some tensions with NHS England, which is responsible 
for purchasing Hepatitis C therapies via the funds in 
its specialised care budget. It can be argued that just 
because an innovative medicine is both clinically effective 
and cost effective according to NICE’s calculations, 
this should not necessarily be taken to mean that it is 
affordable when large volumes of the treatments involved 
are being demanded.
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Part of the concern surrounding Hepatitis C medicines 
pricing10 and costs relates to unresolved questions 
about how many people with the infection should receive 
treatment at what stage in their illness, given the levels of 
experienced distress and the potential costs and benefits 
involved. Notwithstanding NICE’s recommendations, 
NHS England’s current strategy involves spending £190 
million on antiviral medicines licensed for the treatment 
of Hepatitis C in 2016-2017, with the specialised centres 
responsible for providing care being limited to treating 
a total of just over 10,000 patients in the current year. 
These figures imply an average drug cost of a little under 
£20,000 per person accessing therapy, and a ‘drug 
price’ of approaching £21,000 per cure achieved.
Advocates for people with Hepatitis C may question 
the legality as well as the humanity of putting a cap 
on the number of patients to be treated, as might 
some pharmaceutical interests. However, against their 
concerns it can be argued that it represents a reasonable 
response to a highly unusual situation. For the purposes 
of this analysis key points to emphasise again relate 
to the importance of maintaining clinician involvement 
in and support for procurement strategies based on 
‘volume and cost based’ Framework Agreements with a 
range of product suppliers.
It is also worth reiterating the fact that well designed 
tendering processes can achieve significant cost 
reductions even in fields where the treatments available 
have intellectual property protection attached to them, 
provided there is competition between alternative novel 
therapies. From a public interest perspective this is 
desirable, provided that savings are not generated at an 
unacceptable cost to further innovation and individual 
care standards. Public approaches to the purchasing of 
all forms of good and service should be sensitive to their 
overall value to society, not just their price.
Cancer medicines costs and benefits
In Britain anticancer drug pricing and access has been 
the most controversial of all medicines supply areas. This 
is to a degree reflected in the fact that although UK public 
and charitable contributions to cancer research are on a 
per capita basis amongst the highest in the world, NHS 
spending on such products has tended to lag behind 
that recorded in other similarly wealthy nations (Jonsson 
et al, 2016). Recent public debate has focused on issues 
ranging from the supply of Trastuzumab to women with 
early stage breast cancer through to the working and 
10 In the US these have reportedly been in the order of $80-100 
thousand per patient treated. However, true outlays are often 
lower due to the effects of discounting driven by competitive 
pressures and expert procurement practices. In poorer countries 
such as India and Egypt (where rates of Hepatitis C infection are 
very high as a result of anti-schistosomiasis programmes that in 
previous decades spread the infection via contaminated needles) 
courses of sofosbuvir are available for under 1 per cent of the US 
list price. 
future role of the Cancer Drugs Fund set up by the 
Cameron/Clegg coalition government in 2010.
The CDF has recently transitioned from being a special 
purchasing fund in England for buying treatments 
regarded by NICE as non-cost effective towards being 
a resource for facilitating the entry of anticancer drugs 
which are of initially uncertain cost effectiveness into 
NHS use. Between its establishment in 2010/11 and 
the decision to reform it in 2015 its cost rose from £200 
million to in the order of £400 million a year, including 
overspend. (The budgeted figure was £340 million in 
2015 – NHS England Cancer Drugs Team, 2016). This 
is a large percentage increase, albeit in absolute terms 
it is no more than the additional sums reportedly spent 
by the NHS on off-patent medicines which were until 
recently available as branded products but are now 
supplied on an exclusive (ie non-competitive) basis as 
much higher cost generic products. Because of this 
change some older exclusively produced treatments 
are no longer subject to effective NHS cost control, 
albeit new arrangements are now being introduced.
Cancer treatment is a complex field, covering many 
different diseases and multiple therapeutic modalities. 
However, from an overall medicines procurement 
perspective it is of note that despite the expenditure 
increases of the last few years anticancer medicine 
outlays in this country are still no more than average 
in European terms. They in total (including all outlays) 
account for about 10 per cent of medicines spending 
in England, or circa £1,500 million annually (Macmillan, 
2015).
This is a substantial sum. Yet it represents little more 
than 1 per cent of gross health service costs or 0.1 per 
cent of the present GDP. Alarmist claims that the costs of 
anticancer medicines are unaffordable should therefore 
be avoided, especially given the reality that once more 
effective treatments have become established their costs 
will in time fall because of patent and other intellectual 
property expiries and enhanced production efficiency.
NHS England will in all probability continue to exert strong 
downward pressure on anticancer medicine costs. In a 
period in which public spending as a whole could face 
increasing curbs this could well be judged necessary by 
many observers. However, as the work of the Accelerated 
Access Review might help to highlight, undue restrictions 
on the amount that the health service is prepared to 
pay for innovative treatments could disadvantage some 
patient groups. Less importantly from a humanitarian 
viewpoint, it might also harm UK based industry. In the 
‘post Brexit’ environment this country has important 
strategic interests in remaining at the front of biomedical 
research and product development.
At this point in history the scientific and financial 
investments made in cancer research and treatment 
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throughout the twentieth century are beginning to make 
significant differences to patient survival. However, 
failures to ensure that NHS users gain timely access to 
advances in cancer treatment could, as in other areas 
of therapeutic advance such as the care of individuals 
and families affected by rare diseases, in time undermine 
confidence in the health service. Achieving excellence in 
drug procurement could well prove an important means 
of avoiding such unwanted outcomes.
Optimising NHS Medicines 
Procurement
When, in the aftermath of World War II, the NHS was first 
established it was the first major tax funded universal 
health care system. The primary intention of the experts 
responsible for its planning during the time of the coalition 
headed by Winston Churchill and the voters who elected 
the subsequent Labour administration led by Clement 
Atlee was not to create the world’s most cost effective 
health care system. It was rather to create the best 
affordable one for everyone in the country.
In a number of important respects this promise has 
been delivered. Yet there is some evidence – particularly 
if the provision of health related social care is added 
into the equation – that because of the centrality of 
taxation as opposed to insurance raised finances to 
the NHS model eventually accepted by Aneurin Bevan 
and his colleagues, the UK has been less willing to fund 
adequate health and social service levels than countries 
such as The Netherlands, France and Germany.
The extent to which such criticisms can with validity 
be made in the case of medicines supply is debatable. 
Notwithstanding the special concerns that exist in 
oncology, the access of people in England and the rest 
of the UK to evidence based pharmaceutical care has 
generally been good, even compared to that observable 
in North America and the richer EU Member States. In the 
specific context of specialised medicines procurement 
facilitated via tendering in fields like that of haemophilia 
care there is reason to believe that NHS purchasing 
practices have in the main been as, or more, advanced 
as any others to be found across the world.
Yet this is not to say that all patient needs have been 
met as well as they could have been, or that further 
improvements in individually oriented care are not 
possible. Nor is to deny that in the years to come there 
are dangers that the situation could deteriorate, unless 
hazards are clearly signposted and action is taken to 
avoid them. Seeking the lowest possible pharmaceutical 
prices without due regard for total value is one such 
problem. Failing to provide optimally effective treatment 
to all in need would be another.
On the basis of the literature review and interviews 
undertaken to support the preparation of this report, the 
view taken here is that the most effective way to defend 
against unwanted trends and build constructively on 
what has to date been achieved is to retain an explicit 
public policy focus on counter-balancing the potential 
ill-effects of unchecked monopsonistic (single buyer) 
medicines purchasing powers. The need to be careful 
with public money should be set alongside a defined 
commitment to defending national (and world-wide) 
public interests in incentivising research and development 
in the biopharmaceutical and related fields and creating 
environments which encourage innovative approaches 
to clinical care delivery.
Regardless of how in detail relevant lines are drawn, 
it has been a long standing strength of the PPRS that 
its stated purpose has not simply been to minimise 
pharmaceutical prices and costs. It is also charged with 
protecting public interests in innovation and industrial 
success. Arguably, similar principles should also be 
clearly embedded in all NHS procurement activities, 
whether or not these are led by NHS England or those 
private procurement agencies that might in future work 
on its behalf or by NHS pharmacists and other health 
professionals with regional or local Trust based roles.
In addition, the recognition given by the 2014 EU 
Procurement Directive to the importance of forming 
Innovation Partnerships in areas where unmet needs 
exist deserves attention – see Box 7. Innovative 
medicines should not be seen as simple context-free 
commodities. They are better regarded as complex 
service linked products that need to be used in well-
informed and constantly improving ways. Dynamic 
partnerships between their producers and users help 
achieve this end. There is therefore a risk that impersonal 
purchasing relationships which discount the value of 
inputs by pharmaceutical or other manufacturers into 
health care quality and outcome improvement initiatives 
would prove counter-productive.
A second strength of the traditional NHS approach to 
specialist medicines procurement as exemplified in fields 
like the treatment of people with haemophilia has been 
the involvement of clinicians in decision making relating 
to their practice fields and in the implementation of 
agreed policies. In future there should be opportunities 
to add further value via, for instance, enabling Clinical 
Reference Groups and patient organisations to extend 
their ‘higher level’ inputs into identifying unmet health 
needs and new therapeutic improvement options. Yet 
care should be taken not to permit any further drift 
towards centralisation to undermine awareness of the 
vital role that local clinician and service user ‘policy 
concordance’ plays. Without this it would be impossible 
for Multi-supplier Framework Agreements to work as 
well as possible, and to deliver efficiency gains in ways 
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consistent with the exercise of informed choice by 
patients and their individual doctors.
Increasing the extent to which service users and their 
representatives are effectively involved in guiding 
medicines (and other) procurement processes11 would 
also be consistent with the stated aims and objectives of 
the AAR. Patient centred caring practices structured in 
ways which seek to resolve the problems that humanity 
faces in an equitable and rational manner are clearly 
desirable. Further developing them should help keep this 
country at the leading edge of health care provision and 
new treatment development, even if exit from Europe 
were eventually to undermine other aspects of the British 
life sciences base.
Recognising value generation
Other examples of ways in which NHS medicines 
procurement might in future be further improved 
range from ensuring that the principle of local ‘gain 
sharing’ is firmly embedded in the use of tendering 
mechanisms through to effectively adopting MEAT (Most 
Economically Advantageous Tender) based purchasing 
strategies. In the case of gain sharing, for example, if 
clinician support for actions which reduce costs at the 
possible expense of support for service improvements is 
to be maximised then some local apportionment of the 
savings achieved is likely to be required. If this common 
sense view is accepted then the key policy options to be 
resolved relate to the extent to which active partnerships 
between external companies and NHS organisations 
such as specialist care centres add value in ways which 
bureaucratically controlled funding transfers cannot 
achieve with similar levels of creative efficiency.
With regard to MEAT based tendering, it similarly makes 
sense to seek to try to include all aspects of value 
generation and consumer gain in purchasing decision 
making. However, this is easier said than achieved. A key 
finding offered here is that despite recognition of the fact 
that price minimisation alone is not the objective of high 
quality procurement, day to day pressures will often mean 
that in practice – unless effective systemic safeguards 
are put in place – price will swamp other considerations. 
While rhetorical respect for the importance of all quality 
dimensions may be prevalent, inadequately managed 
and monitored approaches to medicines procurement 
could in reality foster a ‘cheapness at any cost’ ethos.
Further research is needed to determine the magnitude 
of such risks, and the ways in which they can most 
appropriately be mitigated. However, one way forward 
might, as discussed in Box 7, be to create a low cost but 
robust system that will permit NHS pharmaceutical and 
allied product suppliers to apply for their status as NHS 
11 That is by being able to exercise active choice, rather than simply 
advising others who are in control of decision making.
Innovation Partners to be assessed by an independent 
body. Once awarded, such rankings could – with other 
relevant variables – be used in an agreed manner to 
moderate procurement decisions. Such a measure 
would not, of course, resolve all concerns and possible 
disputes. But it could help to ensure that the spirit of the 
European procurement approach now embodied in this 
country’s legislation is tangibly expressed.
Conclusion
Efficiency gains bring benefits in every sphere of life. Yet 
they may also generate unwanted consequences, unless 
well-structured efforts are made to avoid or minimise 
such costs. In the modern world, in which the accelerated 
working of nation-wide and global markets supported 
by technical advances like computerised information 
systems is putting increasing downward pressures on 
the prices of many products, there is a need to balance 
the advantages of intensified competition generated 
via enhanced procurement practices with the need to 
ensure that valued aspects of goods and services, and 
with them on occasions entire ways of life, are not lost in 
the pursuit of financial savings.
Good procurement strategies help control spending, 
drive growth and increase prosperity. However, in fields 
such as purchasing medicines and using them as wisely 
as possible to promote individual and public health the 
application of commercial values and techniques should 
be tempered by professionalism, and a comprehensive 
and compassionate concern for the care needs of 
individuals and the well-being of entire communities.
Pharmaceutical suppliers should be exposed to robust 
scrutiny and testing competition. But their products 
ought also to be obtained in ways consistent with 
public interests in fairness towards intellectual property 
holders and ongoing private and public investment 
in innovation. Patients with unmet therapeutic needs 
presently stand to gain from fundamental progress in 
areas such as genetics and the application of advances 
in the biopharmaceutical and biomedical sciences to 
the treatment of their conditions. They can also benefit 
from developments in the ways that existing products 
are used to optimise health outcomes. Research based 
pharmaceutical companies have roles to play in both 
these areas.
The NHS is already one of the world’s most advanced 
pharmaceutical purchasers. The available evidence 
shows that its procurement skills, used in ways consistent 
with current British and European law, have – against 
the background provided by factors such as the working 
of the PPRS and NICE’s interventions – kept overall 
spending on medicines and allied products expressed 
as a percentage of GDP below the OECD average. 
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Likewise, despite some access concerns in areas like 
oncology and the treatment of rare diseases, the record 
of the NHS in providing good quality pharmaceutical 
care to those in need of it is good in international terms.
Nevertheless, in the period leading up to Britain’s exit 
from the European Union the health service could well, 
along with other public services, have to face new 
pressures. There is a risk that this will create a situation 
in which procurement processes will become unduly 
focused on minimising prices and immediate spending, 
rather than seeking maximum longer term advantage. At 
worst this will alienate NHS users and the wider public, 
and may in some contexts threaten the sustainable 
supply of medicines. It might also stand in the way of 
forming and maintaining the close partnerships between 
research oriented companies and health care providers 
that this country needs to further enhance its health and 
wealth.
There is no guaranteed way of promoting a healthy 
balance between pursuing the affordability of 
pharmaceuticals and protecting public interests in 
innovation and industrial success. Constructive progress 
will require insight and good-will on all sides. But the 
concluding recommendation offered here is that British 
policy makers should seek to ensure that the strategic 
thinking underlying the MEAT approach outlined in the 
revised 2014 European Public Procurement Directive 
remains central to the future tendering based methods 
employed in the NHS. Otherwise the approach that will 
evolve could, contrary to the spirit presently underpinning 
NICE’s existence and the working of the PPRS as well as 
long term public interests, come to focus exclusively on 
minimising the prices of items purchased at the expense 
of quality and ongoing innovation.
Box	7.	Recognising	NHS	Improvement	Partners
In the 2014 Procurement Directive the concept of 
Improvement Partnerships primarily relates to private 
product providers working with public purchasing 
organisations to develop innovations designed to fill 
identified gaps in the market. But in the health sector 
it might also usefully be applied to agencies like 
pharmaceutical companies working with specialist – 
and other – health service providers in order to optimise 
the use of existing technologies and improve health 
outcomes.
In the haemophilia context, for instance, there is evidence 
that company support for information gathering via 
Haemtrack (see, for instance, http://haemtrack.mdsas.
com/) and the employment of specialist nurses has 
contributed to better service provision. In future it could 
add further to care quality by improving access to 
pharmacokinetic (PK) testing and other core elements 
of personalised treatment provision.
As discussed in the main text, some critics argue 
that health service commissioners alone should be 
in direct control of all aspects of NHS development. 
They may say that if external companies can afford to 
support service improvements it is evidence that they 
are charging too much for their goods or services, 
and that they are only investing such funds in order to 
generate more earnings. The counter argument to this 
is that in properly working free markets such activities 
benefit consumers. The appropriately expanded use 
of tailored therapies should enhance outcomes, while 
closer working between industry and NHS based 
professionals could also benefit new product research 
and service delivery.
From a public interest perspective the most important 
questions in this debate are about whether it is likely 
to be more efficient to work further towards giving 
NHS commissioners total control of all health related 
resources, or if maintaining a degree of ‘social market’ 
flexibility in which clinicians and pharmaceutical 
companies can use marginal resources to institute 
practice innovations and on occasions challenge 
bureaucratic service planners would advantage 
patients and the wider community. The view taken here 
is that the case for the latter interpretation is stronger 
than is likely to be recognised by observers located 
within the established health service command chain.
There can of course be no magic solutions to the 
challenges inherent in seeking to maintain well-balanced 
NHS purchasing strategies. But if it is accepted that 
‘product plus service support’ offers have the potential 
to be more efficient than alternative options one way 
forward could be to grant research based companies 
which offer both innovative products and resources for 
developing new treatment approaches the status of 
‘NHS Improvement Partners’. Such awards could be 
approved in a light touch manner by an independent 
regulatory or monitoring agency. One of the possible 
uses of this would be to help ensure that in MEAT 
based purchasing an agreed value is given to positive 
contributions to pharmaceutical and wider health 
care development. This could reduce the danger of 
contracting for sophisticated items like medicines 
being reduced to simplistic commodity assessments 
and a lowest possible price buying ethos.
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